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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE POWER OF THE COURTS TO DIRECT A
VERDICT ON UNDISPUTED, UNCON-
TRADICTED ORAL TESTIMONY
The recent case of Borough of Nanty-Glo v. Surety
Company' presents again the interesting problem over
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and out-of-state
authorities2 have see-sawed for many years: i.e. when, if
ever, will uncontradicted parol evidence warrant a directed
verdict?
The facts, briefly, were these: The borough of Nanty-
Glo brought suit for the default of its tax-collector whose
faithful performance had been guaranteed by the defendant
surety company. At the trial the tax-collector admitted his
conversion of the funds. A clerk of the borough council
testified that he had, in accordance with instructions from
the borough council notified the insurance company of the
default, by letter. Defendant offered no evidence tending
to contradict the testimony of these two witnesses. The
evidence, if true, warranted judgment for the plaintiff. Ac-
cordingly, the trial judge directed, a verdict for the plain-
tiff.
Said the majority opinion:
"In granting the motion for binding instructions,
the trial judge assumed the (oral) testimony to be true.
This he had no right to do, even though it was uncon-
tradicted. In the words of Justice Sharswood, 'How-
ever clear and indisputable may be the proof, when
it depends upon oral testimony, it is nevertheless the
province of the jury to decide, under the instructions of
the Court, as to the law applicable to the facts, and
subject to the salutary power of the Court to award a
new trial if they should deem the verdict contrary to
the weight of evidence'."
Justice Schaffer wrote a peppery dissent:
"The rule relied upon by the majority has behind
it the idea that there is a clairvoyance in twelve minds
when they sit in a jury box which enables them to
1309 Pa. 236 (1932).
28 A. L. R. 808 a; 72 A. L. R. 20 n.
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know whether a witness is tilling the truth or not. I
can no more credit such a gift than I could that of
fortune telling. I do not believe that when twelve
heads are put together they radiate a power of divina-
tion in this respect superior to that in each individual
cranium... In the ordinary affairs of life such state-
ments (as those of the witnesses in this case) unchal-
lenged would pass for verity. In my opinion they
should in Court.
If the case had gone to the jury and they had
found a verdict for defendant in the face of this testi-
mony, the court would have been compelled to set the
verdict aside since there would be no evidence to sup-
port it."
Justice Schaffer's opinion has considerable support in
previous decisions. Perhaps the best statement is found in
Lonzer v. R. R.3 by Justice Mitchell:
"When the testimony is not in itself improbable,
is not at variance with any proved or admitted facts,
or with ordinary experience, and comes from witnesses
whose candor there is no ground for doubting, the jury
is not at liberty to indulge in a capricious disbelief. If
they do so, it is the duty of the court to set the verdict
aside. * * * * and when that is the case, the court may
refuse to submit it at all and direct a verdict accord-
ingly."
A number of cases before and since have subscribed
to this view.4 There are also some decisions which, though
apparently contradictory of the Lonzer case, are disting-
uishable. Thus, where there was evidence to the contrary,
5
or where the facts were neither admitted nor clearly estab-
lished by undisputed evidence," or where facts, though un-
3196 Pa. 610 (1900).
4Campagna v. Ziskind (1926) 287 Pa. 408; Wolf v. Phila. Transit
Co. (1916) 252 Pa. 448; Timlin v. American Patriots (1915) 249 Pa.
469; Waters v. Amer. Bridge Co. (1902) 234 Pa. 7; Dinan v. Supreme
Council (1904) 210 Pa. 456; Mayor-Brumi v. Ins. Co. (1899) 189 Pa.
579; Corcoran v. Life Ins. Co. (1898) 183 Pa. 443; Holland v. Kindre-
gan (1893) 155 Pa. 156; St. Clair v. Hastings (1920) 74 Pa. Super. Ct.
229.
5Fry v. National Glass Co. (1908) 219 Pa. 514; Devlin v. Beacon
Light Co. (1901) 198 Pa. 583.
!Vandevort v. Steel & Iron Co. (1899) 194 Pa. 118.
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contradicted, were testified to by an interested witness,7
clearly the Lonzer rule was inapplicable. In such cases
there is ground for doubting the candor of the witnesses.
Where a presumption has been established in favor of the
plaintiff thus placing the burden of proof on the defendant,
cases are in conflict as to whether clear and indisputable
oral testimony rebutting the presumption would justify
binding instructions for the defendant8 That binding in-
structions are not proper might be upheld on the basis that
the presumption itself amounts to legal evidence which it
would not be capricious to believe.
On the other hand, there is previous authority for the
Nanty-Glo case.9 That the two views are irreconcilable is
well illustrated by two insurance cases. The facts were
substantially the same: proof by uncontradicted, disinterest-
ed witnesses that the insured had made fraudulent represen-
tations in the application for a policy. Suit was by the bene-
ficiary. Said Justice Finletter in Mayor-Brum v. Insurance
Co-.0:
"We find nothing in the testimony that would
have justified the learned trial judge in submitting the
case to the jury. There was no disputed question of
fact for their consideration. It was conclusively
shown by uncontroverted evidence that the plaintiff
7Bank v. Hoffman (1911) 229 Pa. 429.
GFor Jury: Shaugnessy v. R. R. (1922) 274 Pa. 413; Kreanor v.
R. R. (1906) 214 Pa. 219. For Court: (where evidence to the contrary
is clear, positive and credible, and uncontradicted) Unger v. R. R. (1907)
217 Pa. 106; Ely v. Pitts. R. Co. (1893) 150 Pa. 233; McIntyre v.
Pittsburgh (1913) 238 Pa. 524; Magier v. Phila. R. R. (1917) 257 Pa.
383; Haskins v. R. R. (1928) 293 Pa. 537; also the view of the great
weight of authority, 66 A. L. R. 1536 and cases there cited.
RHartig v. Amer. Ice Co. (1927) 290 Pa. 21; Holzheimer v. Lit
Brothers (1918) 262 Pa. 150; Nydes v. Royal Neighbors (1917) 256
Pa. 381; Newman v. Romanelli (1914) 244 Pa. 142; Carter v. Hend-
erson (1909) 224 Pa. 319; Bartlett v. Rothschild (1906) 214 Pa. 421;
Grambs v. Lynch (1884) 20 WNC 376; Lamb v. Irwin (1871) 69 Pa.
436; Harlow 6 Co. v. Homestead (1899) 194 Pa. 57; Reel v. Elder
(1869) 62 Pa. 308; Lautner v. Kann (1898) 184 Pa. 344; Coal Co. v.
Evans (1896) 176 Pa. 28; Bank v. Donaldson (1847) 6 Pa. 179.
10189 Pa. 579 (1899).
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was not entitled to recover in the suit- and a directed
verdict was proper."
Justice Stewart in Nydes v. Royal Neighbors:".
"However clear and indisputable may be the
proof, when it depends on oral testimony, it is never-
theless the province of the jury to decide. : . "
Hence, the question arises as to which view should be
adopted. Some support in favor of submitting such cases
to the jury may be found from fear that while the testi-
mony may appear indisputable on the record, the demeanor
of the witness might furnish doubts as to his credibility.
That argument would be equally strong against allowing
the court to set aside a verdict contrary to the weight of
the evidence, a power that is unquestioned.12 If the Court
has power to set aside a verdict it is difficult to see why it
should not be given power to compel a proper verdict in
the first place. There is no greater danger attending the
one than the other. True, it is the province of the jury to
decide facts and the courts should not invade the jury's
domain. Far from upholding the jury, however, such pro-
cedure brings it into disrepute. It amounts to this: the court
says to the jury: "It is your province to decide this case,
but if you fail to decide it correctly, another jury will be
called to arrive at a correct decision." And suppose the
second jury makes the same mistake? Are the parties to
be forced to litigate until a jury is found that will give a
proper verdict?
Carried to its ultimate conclusion the decision in the
Nanty-Glo case would bring strange results. Since almost
all evidence is oral and all oral testimony must go to the
jury to have its credibility tested, a directed verdict would
be virtually impossible except where plaintiff has failed to
make out a cause of action, or where either party admits
the facts on which the law defeats him. The incontrovert-
11256 Pa. 381 (1917).
' 2Borough of Nanty-Glo v. Insurance Co. (1932) 309 Pa. 236;
Maloy v. Rosenbaum (1918) 260 Pa. 422; Dinan v. Supreme Council
(1904) 210 Pa. 460.
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ible physical facts rule has been broadly applied in Penns-
sylvania, 13 but since a witness must present the facts on
which the mathematical calculations are based or verify the
photograph or map, the case must go to the jury to decide
if the witness is telling the truth. Though plaintiff in a suit
may establish a prima facie case, a defendant who does
nothing to meet the burden of proof may demand that the
case go to the jury for determination of the credibility of
the witnesses who testified to the facts creating the prima
facie case.
The application of the rule laid down in the Lonzer
case, if left to the discretion of the trial judge whose deci-
sion would not be overthrown except for clear abuse, would
avoid inconsistency. Where essential facts are testified to
by an interested witness, there is some doubt as to the wit-
ness's candor, and the case could properly be said to be one
for the jury. Even the Nanty-Glo case could be thus dis-
tinguished.4 It is safe to say, in any event, that the courts
are unlikely to follow the broad rule laid down by the ma-
jority opinion to its full implication.
Spencer R. Liverant
'sSee 36 D. L. R. 58, November 1932.
141n the Nanty-Glo case, supra, an essential fact to be established
was the giving of notice to the insurance company. A clerk of the
plaintiff testified to this fact. Clearly such a witness would be inter-
ested in the outcome.
